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Calendario
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TEMA |
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Nº
DE CLASE |
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TEMAS |
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LECTURAS |
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1 |
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1 |
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Teoría de la elección |
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Yildiz, M. Material de clase
sobre la teoría de la elección (PDF).
Savage, L. The Foundations
of Statistics.
Kreps, D. Notes on the
Theory of Choice.
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2 |
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2 |
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Introducción, definiciones
(Equilibrio Nash, perfecto y secuencial, racionalizabilidad,
equilibrio correlacionado, inducción hacia
atrás, inducción hacia adelante,
racionalidad secuencial, equilibrios autoconfirmados)
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Fudenberg, D. y J. Tirole.
Caps. 1, 2 y 3.
Osborne, M. J. y A. Rubinstein.
Caps. 2, 3, 4 y 6.
Aumann, R. "Backward Induction
and Common Knowledge of Rationality."
Ben-Porath, E. "Rationality,
Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect
Information Games".
Brandenburger, A. "The
Power of Paradox".
Aumann, R. y A. Brandenburger. "Epistemic
Conditions for Nash Equilibrium".
Bernheim, D. "Rationalizable
Strategic Behavior".
Pearce, D. "Rationalizable
Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection".
Aumann, R. "Correlated
Equilibrium as an Expresssion of Bayesian Rationality".
Kreps, D. y R. Wilson. "Sequential
Equilibria".
Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg y
D. Levine. Payoff Information and Self-Confirming
Equilibrium. Documento de trabajo. http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/papers/ack32rc.pdf
Fudenberg, D. y D. Kreps.
"Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming
Equilibrium".
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3 |
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2 |
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Juegos repetidos |
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Fudenberg y Tirole. Cap.
5.
Osborne y Rubinstein. Cap.
8.
Abreu, D., P. K. Dutta y
L. Smith. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A
NEU Condition".
Fudenberg, D. y E. Maskin.
"The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting
and Incomplete Information".
Fudenberg, D., D. Levine
y E. Maskin. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games
with Imperfect Public Information".
Fudenberg, D., D. M. Kreps
y E. Maskin. "Repeated Games with Long-run and
Short-run Players".
Kandori, M. "Social Norms
and Community Enforcement".
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4 |
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1 |
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Repaso |
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5 |
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1 |
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Juegos
con parloteo (Cheap talk)
(Clase especial impartida por Marco Battaglini) |
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Crawford, V. y J. Sobel.
"Strategic Information Transmission".
Myerson, R. "Multi-Stage
Games with Communication".
Battaglini, M. "Multiple
Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk".
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6 |
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2 |
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Teoría
de la negociación |
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Osborne y Rubinstein. Caps.
7, 15.
Yildiz, M. "Bargaining without
a common prior - An immediate agreement theorem".
Fudenberg y Tirole. Cap.
10
Rubinstein, A. "Perfect Equilibrium
in a Bargaining Model".
Nash, J. "The bargaining
problem".
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7 |
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1 |
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Señalización,
Reputación |
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Fudenberg y Tirole. Cap.
9.
Cho, I.-K. y D. Kreps. "Signalling
Games and Stable Equilibria".
Kreps, D. y R. Wilson. "Reputation
and Imperfect Information".
Milgrom y Roberts. "Predation,
reputation and entry deterrence".
Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J.
Roberts y R. Wilson. "Rational Cooperation in
the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma".
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8 |
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4 |
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Fundamentos
epistemológicos |
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Fudenberg y Tirole. Caps.
2-14.
Yildiz. Material de clase.
Aumann. "Interactive Epistemology".
Dekel, E. y F. Gul. "Rationality
and Knowledge in Game Theory". In Advances
in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications.
Milgrom, P. y N. Stokey.
"Information, Trade and Common Knowledge".
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9 |
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1 |
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Repaso |
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10 |
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4 |
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Aprendizaje
y evolución |
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Weibull. Caps. 2-3.
Fudenberg y Levine. Capítulos
por determinar.
Erev, I. y A. Roth. "On the
Need for Low-Rationality Game Theory". http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~aroth/
Noldeke, G. y L. Samuelson.
"An Evolutionary Analysis of Forward and Backward
Induction".
Kandori, M., G. Mailath y
R. Rob. "Learning, Mutation, and Long-run Equilibria
in Games".
Young, P. "The Evolution
of Conventions".
Ellison, G. "Learning, Local
Interaction and Coordination".
Fudenberg, D. y D. Kreps.
"Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming
Equilibria".
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11 |
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1 |
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Repaso |
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12 |
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1 |
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Juegos
supermodulares |
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Milgrom, P. y J. Roberts.
"Rationalizability and Learning in Games with
Strategic Complementarities".
Milgrom, P. y J. Roberts.
"The LeChatelier Principle".
Vives, X. "Nash Equilibrium
with Strategic Complementarities".
Topkis, D. M. Supermodularity
and Complementarity.
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13 |
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3 |
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Subastas |
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Krishna, V. Caps. 2,
3, 5-7, 10 y 17.
Myerson, R. "Optimal Auction
Design".
Milgrom, P. y R. Weber. "A
Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding".
Che, Y -K. y I. Gale. "Standard
Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders".
Vickrey, W. "Counterspeculation,
Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders".
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14 |
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1 |
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Repaso |
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