Lecturas obligatorias

Fudenberg, Drew y Jean Tirole. Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991.

Osborne, Martin J. y Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994.

Complementarios:

Weibull, Jörgen W. Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995.

Fudenberg, Drew y David K. Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998.

Krishna, Vijay. Auction Theory. San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, 2002.

Lecturas adicionales

Abreu, D., P. K. Dutta y L. Smith. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition". Econometrica 62 (1994): 939-948.

Armstrong, M. "Optimal Multi-Object Auctions". REStud 67 (2000): 455-481.

Athey, S. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information". Econometrica 69 (2001): 861-889.

Athey, S. y K. Bagwell. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information". RAND Journal of Economics 32, 3 (Autumn 2001): 428-465. http://www.stanford.edu/~athey/ocpiwfig.pdf

Aumann, R. "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality". Games and Economic Behavior 8 (1995): 6-19.

Aumann, R. "Interactive Epistemology". Documento de trabajo, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, February 1995.

Aumann, R. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality". Econometrica 55, 1 (January 1987): 1-18.

Aumann, R. y A. Brandenburger. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium". Econometrica 63 (1995): 1161-1180.

Ausubel, L. "A Generalized Vickrey Auction". Mimeo (1999). Universidad de Maryland. http://www.ausubel.com/auction-papers/99wp-generalized-vickrey.pdf

Ausubel, L. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects". Mimeo (1997). Universidad de Maryland. http://www.ausubel.com/auction-papers/efficient-ascending-auction-r.pdf

Battaglini, M. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk". Econometrica 70 (2002): 1379-1401.

Ben-Porath, E. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games". Review of Economic Studies 64 (1997): 23-46.

Bergemann, D. y S. Morris. "Robust Mechanism Design". Documento de trabajo, Universidad de Yale, 2003. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=412497

Bernheim, D. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior". Econometrica 52, 4 (julio 1984): 1007-1028.

Brandenburger, A. "The Power of Paradox: Some Recent Developments in Interactive Epistemology". Original no publicado. 2001.

Bulow, J. y J. Roberts. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions". JPE 97 (1989): 1060-90.

Che, Y-K. y I. Gale. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders". REStud, 65 (1998): 1-22.

Cho, I.-K. y D. Kreps. "Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria". Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (1987): 179-221.

Crawford, V. y J. Sobel. "Strategic Information Transmission". Econometrica 50 (1982): 1431-1451.

Cremer, J. y R. McLean. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions". Econometrica 56 (1988): 1247-1257.

Cremer, J. y R. McLean. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent". Econometrica 53 (1985): 345-361.

Dasgupta, P. y E. Maskin. "Efficient Auctions". Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2000): 341-388.

Dekel, E. y F. Gul. "Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory". Capítulo 6 en Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications. Editado por D. M. Kreps y K. F. Wallis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg y D. Levine. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium". ELSE Documento de trabajo, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution, 1999.

Ellison, G. "Learning, Local Interaction and Coordination". Econometrica 61 (1993): 1047-1071.

Erev, I. y A. Roth. "On the Need for Low-Rationality Game Theory". Mimeo (July 1995). Universidad de Pittsburgh.

Fudenberg, D. y D. Kreps. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium". Games and Economic Behavior 8 (1995): 20-55.

Fudenberg, D. y E. Maskin. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information". Econometrica 54 (1986): 533-54.

Fudenberg, D., D. Levine y E. Maskin. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information". Econometrica 62 (1994): 997-1039.

Fudenberg, D. D. M. Kreps y E. Maskin. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players". Review of Economic Studies 57 (1990): 555-573.

Graham, D. y R. Marshall. "Collusive Behaviour at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions". JPE  95 (1987): 1217-1239.

Gul. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value". Econometrica 57, 1 (enero 1989): 81-95.

Hendrics, K. y R. Porter. "Collusion in Auctions". Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 15/16 (1989): 217-230.

Izmalkov, S. "English Auctions with Reentry." Documento de trabajo. 2003. http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=465

Jehiel, P. y Moldovanu, B. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations". Econometrica 69 (2001): 1237-1259.

Kandori, M. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement" Review of Economic Studies 59 (1992): 63-80.

Kandori, M., G. Mailath, and R. Rob. "Learning, Mutation, and Long-run Equilibria in Games". Econometrica 61 (1993): 29-56.

Klemperer, P. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory". In Advances in Economics and Econometrics. Editado por M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen y S. Turnovsky. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003.

Kreps y Wilson. "Sequential Equilibria". Econometrica 50 (1982): 863-894.

Kreps, D. Notes on the Theory of Choice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988.

Kreps, D. y R. Wilson. "Reputation and Imperfect Information". Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982): 253-279.

Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts y R. Wilson. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma". Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982): 245-52.

Krishna, V. "Asymmetric English Auctions". JET  (2003). (Forthcoming)

Krishna, V. y M. Perry. "Efficient Mechanism Design". Mimeo (1998).  http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~motty/papers/vcg19.pdf

Maskin, E. "Auctions and Efficiency". In Advances in Economics and Econometrics. Edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen y S. Turnovsky. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003.

Maskin, E. "Auctions and Privatization". In Privatization. Edited by H. Siebert. Institut fur Weltwertschaft an der Universitat Kiel, 1992.

Marx, L. y R. C. Marshall. "Bidder Collusion". Documento de trabajo. 2003. http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~marx/bio/papers/biddercollusion.pdf

McAfee, P. y J. McMillan. "Bidding Rings". AER 82 (1992): 579-599.

Milgrom, P. y J. Roberts. "Predation, reputation and entry deterrence". Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982): 280-312.

Milgrom, P. y J. Roberts. "Rationalizability and Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities". Econometrica 58 (1990): 1255-1277.

Milgrom, P. y J. Roberts. "The LeChatelier Principle". The American Economic Review 86, 1 (marzo 1996): 173-179.

Milgrom, P. y N. Stokey. "Information, Trade and Common Knowledge". Journal of Economic Theory 26 (1982): 177-227.

Milgrom, P. y R. Weber. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding". Econometrica 50 (1982): 1089-1122.

Milgrom, P. y R. Weber. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II". In The Economic Theory of Auctions. Editado por P. Klemperer. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2000.

Myerson, R. "Multi-Stage Games with Communication". Econometrica 54 (1986): 323-358.

Myerson, R. "Optimal Auction Design." Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1981): 58-73.

Nash, J. "The Bargaining Problem". Econometrica 18 (1950): 155-162.

Noldeke, G. y L. Samuelson. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Forward and Backward Induction". Games and Economic Behavior 5 (1993): 425-454.

Pearce, D. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection". Econometrica 52 (1984): 1029-1050.

Pearce, D. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection". Econometrica 52, 4 (julio 1984): 1029-1050.

Perry, M. y P. Reny. “Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium.” Documento de trabajo. 2002. http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/preny/research.htm

Pesendorfer, W. y J. Swinkels. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions". American Economic Review 90 (2000): 499-525.

Rubinstein, A. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model". Econometrica 50, 1 (enero 1982): 97-110.

Savage, L. The Foundations of Statistics. New York: Wiley, 1954.

Stole y Zwiebel. "Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts". The Review of Economic Studies 63, 3 (July 1996): 375-410.

Topkis, D. M. Supermodularity and Complementarity. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Vickrey, W. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders". Journal of Finance 93 (1961): 675-689.

Vives, X. "Nash Equilibrium with Strategic Complementarities". Journal of Mathematical Economics 19 (1990): 305-321.

Yildiz, M. "Bargaining without a common prior - An immediate agreement theorem". Econometrica 71, 3 (mayo 2003): 793-811.

Yildiz, M. "Sequential Bargaining without a Common Prior on Recognition Process". Unpublished manuscript. 2001.

Young, P. "The Evolution of Conventions". Econometrica 61 (1993): 57-84.